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The German Aerospace Center (DLR) is currently developing 
a Terrain Awareness and Warning System (TAWS) utilizing the 
worst case execution time (WCET)-Aware PaRallelization of 
Model-Based Applications for HeteroGeneOus Parallel Systems 
(ARGO) approach. The basic functions of the TAWS were 
modelled based on the Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning 
System (EGPWS) by Honeywell which is installed in DLR’s 
research aircraft ATRA. Moreover, beyond the existing 
capabilities, “Enhanced” functions are being implemented in 
order to demonstrate the possibilities that become available 
through the use of parallelization for multicore platforms and to 
investigate new approaches to improve the protection against 
Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT) accidents. After 
introducing the parallel multicore TAWS development, this 
paper describes the enhanced functions that make use of the 
Electronic Flight Instrument System (EFIS) for displaying a 
predictor symbol that represents the aircraft’s future position as 
well as possible terrain conflicts. 
Keywords—TAWS, CFIT, multi-core, parallelization 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Parallelization of model-based applications provides 
efficient use of multicore platforms and thus increases the 
information processing capabilities, so that it furnishes 
effective software development for complex and feature-rich 
real-time systems. Parallelization and multicore platforms for 
airborne systems have been studied in the last decade. 
However, current literature mostly focuses on the applicability 
of multicore platforms regarding safety constraints [1, 2, 3, 4, 
5]. DLR’s effort instead aims at investigating the benefits of 
parallelization to create next generation avionic systems. 
In this context, this endeavor investigates replacing the 
commercial Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System 
(EGPWS) alerting envelopes which trigger the look-ahead 
warnings by continuous flight simulations executed at runtime. 
This way, the aircraft’s future position can be precisely 
identified, checked for terrain conflicts and presented in the 
Navigation Display (ND) in the form of a predictor symbol. 
Furthermore, in the case of a detected conflict, said simulations 
are used to find safe alternative flight paths that are displayed 
in the ND as well. The pilot can then decide which action to 
take in order to clear the conflict by steering the predictor 
symbol onto one of the displayed trajectories. Further support 
is offered by cues displayed in the Primary Flight Display 
(PFD), showing the minimum roll and/or pitch angle required 
for an evasive action.  
This paper first presents the ARGO project before 
introducing the development of a parallel multicore Terrain 
Awareness and Warning System (TAWS). After elaborating on 
the conventional and enhanced features, the conceptual design 
of the predictor symbology is explained.  
II. THE ARGO PROJECT  
While the increased computing power and other 
performance benefits associated with parallel architectures are 
very promising for a variety of applications, developing 
embedded parallel real-time software for multicore processors 
is still a time-consuming and error-prone task. Some of the 
main reasons are: 
 It is hard to predict the performance of a parallel 
program and therefore hard to determine if real-time 
timing constraints are met. 
 New potential errors like race conditions and dead locks 
are introduced. These errors are often hard to reproduce 
and therefore hard to test for. 
 The parallelization approach of an application is 
optimized for a specific number of cores resulting in a 
high porting effort when there is need for changing the 
number of cores. 
In order to address these challenges, the EU project ARGO, 
which is funded by the Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation 
Program, was created. It is addressing the code generation for 
WCET aware parallelization of model-based applications for 
multicore systems by providing an integrated toolchain. 
The ARGO model-based design workflow (Fig. 1) starts with 
the controller modeling in which the application models are 
implemented using the Scilab/Xcos open source model-based 
design and simulation environment [6]. The workflow includes 
target architecture specification using an Architecture 
Description Language (ADL), model-to-text transformations 
for code generation and a series of code (text-to-text) 
transformations, based on the information about task 
dependencies in terms of data needed to be communicated 
between tasks as well as shared resources access 
characteristics. The core and system level WCET step 
calculates the multicore worst case execution time for the target 
architecture. With iterative optimizations, an explicit parallel 
program  representation  with  synchronizations  and  address 
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Fig. 1  The ARGO model-based design workflow with integrated 
toolchain. 
 
mappings is reached at the end. The details of the proposed 
approach can be found in [7].  
A TAWS was chosen as DLR's use case contribution to the 
ARGO project. “TAWS” defines a set of features which aim to 
prevent Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT). This type of 
accident was responsible for many fatalities in civil aviation 
until the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) made it 
mandatory for all turbine-powered passenger aircraft with six 
or more passenger seats registered in the U.S. to have TAWS 
equipment installed [8]. There are various TAWS options 
available in the market for various platforms in various 
configurations. The core feature of such a system is creating 
visual and aural warnings between 30 ft to 2450 ft Above 
Ground Level (AGL) in order to avoid controlled flight into the 
terrain. These warnings are categorized in five modes, which 
will be referred to as “basic modes” or simply “GPWS” in this 
paper: 
 
Fig. 2  Mode 1: Excessive Descent Rate. 
 
 
Fig. 3  Draft of the Scilab/Xcos diagram for Mode 1: Excessive Descent 
Rate.  
 Excessive Descent Rate: warnings for excessive descent 
rates for all phases of flight. 
 Excessive Terrain Closure Rate: warnings to protect the 
aircraft from impacting the ground when terrain is rising 
rapidly with respect to the aircraft. 
 Altitude Loss After Take-off: warnings when a 
significant altitude loss is detected after take-off or 
during a low altitude go around. 
 Unsafe Terrain Clearance: warnings when there is no 
sufficient terrain clearance regarding the phase of the 
flight, aircraft configuration and speed. 
 Excessive Deviation Below Glideslope: warnings when 
the aircraft descends below the glideslope. 
Additionally, a TAWS may provide some enhanced 
functions, like the Terrain Awareness Display and Terrain 
Look Ahead Alerting, which rely on a terrain elevation 
database. They are included in the EGPWS by Honeywell 
which is installed in DLR’s Airbus A320 Advanced 
Technologies Research Aircraft (ATRA). The enhanced 
functions relevant for this paper will be described in more 
detail in section IV. 
The decision by DLR to develop an interpretation of the 
EGPWS - which is derived from the Pilot Manual - as a use 
case was due to the fact that the system has an immanent 
potential to be parallelized: the five basic modes and also the 
enhanced functions operate independently from each other.  
 Fig. 4  Vertical geometry of the Terrain Look Ahead Alerting’s caution 
and warning envelopes. 
III. DEVELOPMENT OF DLR’S TAWS  
Following ARGO's model-based design workflow and 
utilizing the integrated toolchain, the basic modes of the 
TAWS have been developed using Scilab/Xcos. The 
algorithms for the conventional enhanced functions such as 
Terrain Awareness Display and Terrain Look Ahead Alerting 
are implemented within the model as Scilab scripts. 
The Excessive Descent Rate mode that is depicted in Fig. 2 
can be introduced as an example. An overview of its 
implementation in Scilab/Xcos is given in Fig. 3. The three 
aircraft have the same altitude of about 2000 ft, but different 
rates of descent, which is demonstrated by their position in the 
graph and their orientation. While the green aircraft is in a safe 
flight state, the orange one’s rate of descent causes a warning. 
The red aircraft’s descent rate, however, is too high 
considering its low altitude, requiring immediate action by the 
pilot. More details on this development effort can be found in 
[9]. 
IV. CONVENTIONAL AND NEW ENHANCED FUNCTIONS 
Of all the EGPWS functions available, two have been 
chosen to be realized for the ARGO use case: the Terrain Look 
Ahead Alerting and the Terrain Alerting Display. Other 
features like the Terrain or Runway Field Clearance Floor 
(TCF or RFCF, respectively) have been excluded since the 
estimated workload for their implementation was considered 
much higher than the payoff that is to be expected within the 
context of DLR’s Air Vehicle Simulator (AVES). There, the 
new TAWS is going be integrated in the A320 cockpit. 
The Terrain Look Ahead Alerting makes the pilot aware of 
potential conflicts with the terrain, based on the information 
that is stored in the EGPWS’ terrain elevation database. The 
algorithm requires the aircraft’s position, track, ground speed 
and altitude as input parameters. With these, two virtual 
envelopes representing several possible trajectories are 
projected forward of the aircraft and checked for collisions. 
These envelopes are called “ribbons” [10]. The bigger one, 
with a range equivalent to up to 60 seconds of flight, triggers a 
caution and the smaller one will result in a warning if a 
collision is found to occur in 30 seconds or less. Both ribbons 
start with a width of ¼ nm and extend outwards laterally at an 
angle of  3°,  while first running down, forward and  finally up 
 
 
Fig. 5  Horizontal geometry of the Terrain Look Ahead Alerting’s 
caution and warning  envelopes. 
 
higher than the aircraft’s current altitude (see Fig. 4 and Fig. 5). 
As this shape is designed to yield several possibilities of the 
aircraft starting to sink or not being able to climb sufficiently, it 
may consequently result in nuisance warnings. 
In order to avoid this, it was decided to replace the two 
envelopes by a predictor function that, in comparison, very 
exactly calculates the future position of the aircraft and checks 
it for terrain conflicts. 
Honeywell’s Terrain Alerting and Display in its original 
implementation features a terrain image that can be switched 
on and off on the Navigation Display. The visible geographic 
area is determined by the display range of the ND which can be 
set to 10, 20, 40, 80, 160 or 320 nautical miles. The terrain 
itself is colored according to the threat it poses to the aircraft, 
whereas terrain lying at or above the aircraft's altitude is 
colored yellow to red and terrain below is colored green to 
black. 
Conventionally, when a caution or warning alert is triggered by 
the Terrain Look Ahead Alerting, the critical area of the terrain 
image will be lit up in the ND [10]. A solid yellow corresponds 
to a caution and a bright red to a warning alert. As the ribbons 
cover a section of airspace not only in front of, but also well 
below the aircraft, even terrain that does not pose an immediate 
threat will be brought to the pilot’s attention by the aural alert 
and the optical cue in the ND. 
While this helps to maintain a safety clearance off the 
terrain, it leaves the final assessment of the situation to the 
pilot: is the alert due to an impending collision or to an 
undershooting of the required clearance? Is it better to climb or 
to pass the critical terrain by making a turn? If climbing, how 
much altitude should be gained and how fast? Alternatively, 
can the alert probably be regarded as a nuisance warning? 
To decrease the pilot’s cognitive workload that is caused by 
these questions, the authors propose the following 
enhancements to the PFD and the ND, all of which are 
activated only in case of a caution or a warning: 
 Optical cues in the PFD’s attitude indicators, visualizing 
the minimum Rate of Climb (ROC) and roll angles that 
are necessary to execute an evasive maneuver 
 A red Flight Path Predictor (FPP) symbol, shaped like 
the aircraft symbol, showing the aircraft’s position 60s 
ahead in time in the ND’s terrain image 
 
 
Fig. 6  Example for the bank angle and Rate of Climb target values 
presented as bugs in the PFD. 
 One or two bright green symbols, shaped like the 
predictor symbol, showing suggestions for horizontal 
evasion maneuvers (left or right turn; if available) in 
the ND’s terrain image 
Depending on the situation, a straightforward vertical 
maneuver might be the most practical choice of action to avoid 
the terrain, as no changes to the course have to be made. 
However, with the optical cues available in an ND alone, no 
information can be given about the required ROC to stay clear 
of the obstacle. It was therefore decided to make use of the 
PFD’s vertical speed indicator to close this gap. There are two 
conceivable means by which target values can be displayed: 
the first one is by using symbols called “bugs”, and the second 
by coloring the safe and unsafe areas of the meter in green and 
red, respectively. The second method is already present in 
Terrain Collision Avoidance Systems (TCAS), where the 
direction and necessary extent of a vertical avoidance 
maneuver are conveyed to the pilot in the same way.  
Without regard of which approach is chosen, a future effort 
should be to make this feature compatible to TCAS, so that the 
advisories from each system complement each other, rather 
than contradict or cancel each other out. 
Considering performance, a horizontal maneuver may well 
be a more favorable option in certain cases. Again, one way to 
inform the pilot about the required action can be a bug on the 
attitude indicator, representing the minimum bank angle 
necessary to initiate a sufficient turn. Similar to the ROC cue 
on the vertical speed indicator, this can alternatively be a color 
coding in green and red. However, depending on the terrain 
ahead, both a left and a right turn may be feasible, resulting in 
two target values to be displayed. In any case, the ROC and the 
bank angle cues should be implemented coherently. See Fig. 6 
and Fig. 7 for examples of the two approaches. 
The aircraft’s future position as shown by the Flight Path 
Predictor must be identified as precisely as possible, in order to 
allow for the absence of wide safety margins as they are 
present in the ribbons of Honeywell’s Terrain Look Ahead 
Alerting. The authors plan to achieve this by utilizing DLR’s 
Generic Aircraft Simulation (GAS), a simplified version of the 
A320 simulation model employed in AVES that uses linearized 
aerodynamic derivatives. 
 
Fig. 7  Example for the bank angle and Rate of Climb target values 
presented as green areas in the PFD. 
In forward flight, the GAS will accept the current control 
inputs, flight control settings and sensor data as parameters to 
calculate the position of the aircraft in 60 seconds, provided 
that the control input is left unchanged. For example, in 
horizontal steady flight, the predicted position will be straight 
ahead and at the same altitude as the aircraft. The GAS 
simulations will be executed continuously, making sure to keep 
the prediction up to date with changes in the control inputs. 
Accurate predictions during a turn are harder to achieve, as 
there is no definite information about how long the pilot will 
continue to turn. An active flight plan may not suffice as a 
guarantee, but it can be the base to make an assumption for 
when the turn is complete. Therefore, as long as the aircraft 
follows the flight path designated by the Flight Management 
and Guidance Computer (FMGC), turns are assumed to end as 
soon as the aircraft is directed towards the next waypoint. The 
remainder of the predicted flight time is assumed to be spent 
without turns.  
In case of angular deviations from the flight path however, 
these assumptions are not valid. In addition, the approach to 
extrapolate the current flight state for 60 seconds is much likely 
to lead to nuisance warnings, as the simulated turns will often 
continue for longer than the pilot desires. One example is a 
change of course of 60° with the standard turn rate of 3° per 
second. While this will take only 20 seconds in reality, the 
prediction would continue the turn for another 40 seconds, 
leading to a complete turnaround (180°). This is problematic as 
it causes the algorithm to consider terrain for the collision 
detection that the aircraft is currently passing by, and needs to 
be avoided. 
Therefore, a different approach is necessary for outside the 
fight path or for free flight. The authors propose to have the 
algorithm assume that any turn in this domain ends after a 
change of course of 45°- whereas the exact number is subject 
to research - and forward flight resumes. As the GAS is 
performing the simulations continuously, any conflicting 
terrain will still be recognized as the turn continues, thus 
covering the cases where a complete turnaround is indeed the 
pilot’s intention. 
 
 
Fig. 8  Example for the Flight Path Predictor and the avoidance maneuver 
symbols in the Navigation Display. 
If an impeding collision has been identified, it is visualized by 
displaying the FPP as a second, red aircraft symbol on the ND. 
It is located at the furthest point of the prediction, i.e. 60 
seconds ahead, and remains visible until the obstacle is no 
longer a threat. Through the continuous simulations, the 
consequences for the flight path will be directly visible as 
movements of the FPP as soon as control changes (or other 
influences) are introduced. 
In addition to the flight path prediction, the GAS will be 
used to evaluate avoidance maneuvers as well as to identify the 
target values for the above described PFD cues. The idea is to 
run three initial simulations: a left turn, a right turn and a 
strictly vertical evasion. The maximum bank angles for the 
turns are 10° and -10°
1
 and all three simulated maneuvers 
feature a ROC of 1000 feet per minute. If all positions along 
these simulated 60 second flight paths are free of conflicts with 
the terrain (including a safety margin), they will be used as the 
source for the cues in the PFD and the bright green aircraft 
symbols in the ND that represent the horizontal avoidance 
maneuvers (Fig. 8). 
If one of the turn simulations remains conflicted, it will be 
repeated, first with 15°, then 20° of maximum bank angle and 
so forth, if necessary.  However, if the vertical evasion is found 
to be insufficient, not only will itself be repeated with an ROC 
of 2000 feet per minute (and again with 3000, if required), but 
the turning maneuvers will also be simulated anew, starting at 
+/-10°  of bank angle and utilizing the new climb rate. This is 
necessary to keep the displayed target values for ROC and 
bank angle consistent with each other and the conducted 
simulations. 
                                                          
1
 A turn maneuver in the simulation will consist of two rolling 
movements: one to achieve the maximum bank angle, and the second, 
following suit, to return to a bank angle of 0°. 
For example, a mountain range straight ahead of the aircraft 
is detected by the algorithm as a terrain conflict. The first run 
of the three simulations does not bring up any sufficient 
maneuvers. All three simulations are repeated with an ROC of 
2000 feet per minute, although making more narrow turns with 
a higher bank angle instead may solve the problem as well. 
However, this would mean that, along with the sufficient bank 
angle, the - in itself insufficient - climb rate of 1000 feet per 
minute was displayed in the PFD, which is considered 
counterproductive by the authors. 
It should be mentioned that air density and temperature, as 
well as the current aircraft mass are parameters of the GAS, so 
that performance issues are not ignored or left up to 
assumptions. Furthermore, the aircraft’s stall speed and 
maximum load factor are considered to exclude maneuvers that 
would lead to unsafe flight states. In the case that the desired 
terrain clearance cannot be achieved due to one or several of 
these restrictions, the last resort is to minimize the safety 
margin and repeat the last simulation so that an avoidance 
maneuver may still be found. 
Running the path evaluating simulations will continue until 
at least one sufficient evasion maneuver is found. After that, 
the thus identified maneuver(s) will continue to be simulated 
along with the flight path prediction, in order to allow for 
immediate adaption to new circumstances, like more terrain 
that had not been in range for the detection before. This way, 
the pilot will be given as much time as possible to react to new 
conflicts along the avoidance path. See Fig. 8 again as an 
example: if the pilot chooses the left maneuver, he will still be 
heading towards conflicting terrain. But as the simulation of 
the same maneuver continues to predict the next 60 seconds, 
the conflict will be detected and the maneuver will be adapted. 
Once the obstacle detection finds that there are no conflicts 
left along the predicted flight path, the simulation of avoidance 
maneuvers will cease and the FPP symbol will turn from red to 
white. 5 seconds later, it will disappear completely to avoid 
unnecessary display cluttering.  
The Scilab/Xcos model of the GAS, running with a step 
size of 0.1 seconds to a simulated time of 17 seconds, was 
experienced to be considerably slower than real time during 
model-in-the-loop tests with the basic TAWS. Therefore, it is 
not unlikely that the above described approach will overstrain 
the capabilities of the target hardware. However, the 
optimization and parallelization of the software that is 
promised by the ARGO toolchain, together with the 
performance boost by the multicore hardware, may be able to 
solve this shortcoming. If this is not the case, the hardware 
requirements will have to be lowered by increasing the step 
size in as many iterations as necessary until the GAS can be 
run without frame drops. Of course, the achievable precision 
will then have to be evaluated. 
V. THE DECISION FOR PFD AND ND  
Since the introduction of Honeywell's EGPWS in 1996, 
several other TAWS have been developed. Some of them (like 
the EGPWS integrated with BendixKing’s AeroVue [11] or 
Rockwell Collins’ Helisure Helicopter Synthetic Vision 
System [12]) offer a synthetic view from the cockpit and are 
therefore called Synthetic Vision Systems (SVS). They are 
usually combined with an arrangement of altitude, airspeed and 
track meters as well as attitude indicators, enabling them to act 
as replacements - if their certification allows for it - for the 
conventional PFD. Given that a lack of situational awareness 
was found to be the reason for most CFIT accidents, presenting 
the pilot with an artificial and enhanced view of the upcoming 
terrain seems to be the obvious choice for further improving 
the avoidance capabilities. 
However, Andre and Wickens suggest otherwise in [13]. 
They claim that sometimes "users want what's not best for 
them", hinting at how 3D is not superior to 2D in every aspect 
or for every task. For example, the location of objects along 
lines of sight into the display's viewing plane is ambiguous 
[14]. 
Also, space in a 3D view is nonlinearly compressed, 
resulting in the distortion of distances and angles [15]. Picking 
up on these findings, St. John concluded that 3D displays are to 
be preferred for tasks that demand an intuitive understanding of 
the shape of objects or scenes, whereas 2D displays are better 
for precise judgment of relative positions [16]. 
In the case of TAWS, it is possible to argue for either: on 
the one hand, understanding the shape of the terrain in general 
may be more important for evasive maneuvers than precise 
judgment of the distance to the conflicting terrain. 
Consequently, St. John arrived at the conclusion that avoidance 
tasks are best performed with a 3D display [16]. On the other 
hand, however, a two-dimensional top view of the terrain may 
well have advantages of its own.  
As the approach of upgrading the PFD to a three-
dimensional SVS display has been used by various 
manufacturers before, the authors considered it more rewarding 
to explore the potential of a further enhanced 2D Navigational 
Display. This decision is also supported by the fact that a 
terrain image in an SVS requires rendering of the three-
dimensional terrain, which is a necessity that can be avoided 
with 2D displays. 
Another possible advantage is that a color-coded terrain 
image with a predictor symbol will likely not only help the 
pilot to meter the distance to impact more precisely and thus 
assess the criticality of a potential collision, but will also allow 
him to plan ahead further than he can directly see. In contrast, 
due to the virtual line of sight in an SVS, the presented terrain 
may obstruct the view of more obstacles in a 3D display.  
Finally, utilizing a conventional EFIS in the described way 
rather than an integrated SVS allows for a compromise 
between two extremes: offering complete situational awareness 
on the one hand and merely advising the pilot how to evade on 
the other hand. While the former has the advantage that the 
pilot can make a thought-out decision based on a full 
understanding of the whole situation, this process is likely to be 
time-consuming [17]. Evasion commands in the way of a 
Flight Director are easy to act on quickly, but do not keep the 
pilot informed about the reasons for the maneuver. Therefore, 
the aforementioned approach was chosen. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, the use of parallelized applications on 
multicore platforms for avionics, especially their potential 
benefits, has been discussed. The focus was placed on an 
TAWS that is developed as a use case for the EU-project 
ARGO.  
After introducing the project and giving insight into the 
model-based development with Scilab/Xcos, the conventional 
features of Honeywell’s EGPWS have been described, 
followed by an explanation of the new enhanced features 
currently in development at DLR. Finally, the decision to add 
functionality to the conventional Electronic Flight Instrument 
System, rather than employing a Synthetic Vision System, was 
discussed.  
The next steps include the implementation of the described 
approach with Scilab/Xcos. Parallel C code will be 
automatically generated by the toolchain and will then have to 
be applied to the target hardware designated by the ARGO 
consortium. Then the final step will be to integrate it into the 
simulation infrastructure of AVES in order to conduct pilot-in-
the-loop validation. 
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